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BEST PRACTICE RE-CREATION AS TRANSFER OF FLUIDS
Alphonse, John, University of Oslo, Gaustadalleen 23, P.O. Box 1080 Blindern, 0316 Oslo,
Norway, johna@ifi.uio.no

Abstract
Successful transfer of knowledge can be a significant source of competitive advantage for an
organization. Such transfers have not however been easy and re-creating best practices in particular
have been shown to produce high variances in outcomes. We see the ‘social’ aspects of knowledge and
the transfer process as a complexity contributing to the variances. With the aim of increasing our
understanding of these complex social knowledge transfers, we study the best practice re-creation of
the system for selling mobile content from Norway to Malaysia. What was successfully accomplished
here was to change the way mobile content was transacted in the whole Malaysian market. Using
developments in the ANT literature, we use the ‘fluid’ concept as a framework to analyze the transfer
process. We show how viewing best practices as fluids aids our understanding on how to manage such
transfers successfully. Fluids have unclear boundaries, multiple identities and changing ownership.
Shifting ownership and control in particular helps create the flow necessary for transfer.
Keywords: knowledge transfer, best practice, CPA, mobile content, fluids, identity, ownership
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1

INTRODUCTION

A particular form of knowledge is addressed in this paper. It is what Dosi, Nelson & Winter (2000)
refers to as an organization’s ability to perform – to create a product or provide a service. That ability
to create and utilize such knowledge is an organization’s most important source for sustainable
competitive advantages (Nonaka, Toyama and Nagata, 2000). The efficient transfer of that knowledge
within a multiunit organizations makes that organization more productive than those that are less
efficient in doing so (Argote et al, 2000). The existence of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) is
based on inter-firm knowledge creation and transfer being more efficient than that of the market
(Kogut and Zander, 2003). Further in MNCs, the creation of knowledge occurs at dispersed locations
(Dinur, 1999) and there are opportunities to integrate and re-combine knowledge across a number of
organizations (Zander, 2002). Groups of organizations operating similar businesses can learn from
each other’s experiences (Ingram and Simons, 2002) with the experiences in one context also acting as
a testing bed for the other businesses (Kluge, Stein and Licht, 2001).
Knowledge transfer across organizations are however often laborious, time consuming and difficult
(Szulanski, 2000) and groups of organizations often fail to leverage knowledge they have of existing
best practices within an organisation (Szulanski, 2003). In health care organizations, even best
practices and policies that could save patient lives are rarely adopted widely and those that are
adopted, experience high variations in outcomes (Berta and Baker, 2004). Further evidence of the
difficulties in sharing knowledge and transferring best practices for value creation is shown in studies
of mergers and acquisitions. The performance of post-merger companies by: 1) stock market
performance, 2) accounting financial results and 3) market share increases, when compared with
similar companies which did not merge, showed in the majority of cases no positive gain for the
merged organizations (Berggren, 2003).
So why is knowledge transfer difficult? The word ‘transfer’ whether as a description or metaphor
beguiles a certain simplicity. Carlile (2004) argues that the usage of this word stems from Shannon
and Weavers approach to information and communication. The concept of moving bits and bytes
within IT systems in an organization had been extended over time to cover the learning, adoption and
implementation of business practices. But what is being transferred are not 0’s and 1’s but knowledge
which has been socially constituted and the transfer process mediated by social processes. The ‘social’
then is the fundamental difference between the information processing transfer and the complex social
knowledge transfer. The social dimension provides a strong theme for explaining the difficulties with
transferring knowledge – Some of the major reasons cited for the difficulties in knowledge transfer
include a lack of a common language, coding or structure (Davenport and Prusack, 1998; Szulanski
2003; Dosi, Nelson & Winter, 2000); and a lack of Absorptive Capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990),
where differing prior experiences leads to less understanding and subsequently transfer.
In order to examine this complex social knowledge transfer, we study the Norwegian mobile operator
Telenor’s knowledge transfer of the system for selling mobile content in the Norwegian market to its
subsidiary in Malaysia, DiGi. The system, known as the Content Provider Access (CPA) system was
considered a best practice by Telenor which it intended to try and re-create in the companies and
markets it had interests in, DiGi and Malaysia being one. The system required cooperation among all
the operators. So, knowledge would not only have to be transferred to DiGi but to all of DiGi’s
competitors as well. What was actually intended, was to change the system in which mobile content
was transacted in the whole Malaysian market. It was comparatively easier for Telenor to do this the
first time in Norway as it was the incumbent dominant player with more than 70% market share. DiGi
was however the 3rd largest operator in Malaysia with 17% market share. Norway and Malaysia as
well in terms of economic and social development were very far apart. With such organizational,
social and market differences it was a transfer which was more likely to fail than to succeed.
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Nevertheless, a year later, the Norwegian CPA system had been re-created in Malaysia with all the
operators and content providers adopting the system. Even more impressively, another year later, DiGi
had achieved 80% of the current ARPU (Average Revenue Per User) of Telenor in Norway for mobile
content. This made this best practice re-creation the most successful ever achieved by Telenor till then.
One contribution this paper will make is to describe the details of how this knowledge transfer was
achieved. This would be an important contribution given the importance and difficulty in achieving
successful knowledge transfers and best practice re-creations.
Although related to the ’social’ another source of difficulties in knowledge transfer and best practice
re-creation, in particular, is the fact that these practices do not stand alone. Best practices comprise of
a coherent system of routines and often form an inter-connected network with technical and social
systems. The best practice cannot be changed piecemeal without affecting the total performance. It is
trapped within a local optimum (Narduzzo, Rocco & Warglien, 2000). This forms another interesting
aspect of our study as Telenor did in fact adopt a piecemeal approach to the transfer. Yet, another way
of viewing a best practice is not as objects, piecemeal or whole, or even as a network but in a different
paradigm more in terms of the ‘space’ it occupies as opposed to the ‘shape’. This is the second
contribution of this paper, to use the concepts of ‘fluids’ from the developments of the Actor-network
Theory literature, as a theoretical model to further our understanding of best practice re-creations.

2

FLUIDS

ANT in its original form tells that entities “acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with
other entities” (Law, 1999, pp 3). An entity or object is then “an effect of stable arrays or networks of
relations” (Law, 2002, pp. 91). A best practice would be such a network made up with various actors
having fixed relations between them. Re-creating the best practice would be re-creating that same
actor network in a new context. This would be both a reasonable and useful way to view best practice
re-creation. The discussion would be on how the interests of the various actors get translated so that
enrolment in the actor network is achieved. The emphasis would inevitably be towards creating a fixed
and stable actor network implying fixed and stable relations between the actors. However, firstly our
focus would then be on relations and stability and not on flows (transfer). Secondly, a stable network
with fixed relations doesn’t always represent reality. The fluid concept has been used to describe
entities whose flexibility made it more adaptive and robust. Fluids travel well and can be shaped and
re-shaped. A study of fluids is a study of flows (Mol and Law, 1994) which is our intended focus of
knowledge transfer and best practice re-creation.
Fluids were first used to describe the disease anaemia. Here Mol & Law (1994) argue that some
entities are not defined by fixed boundaries or fixed relations thus making viewing them as regions or
networks inapt. The fluid space has the characteristics of having firstly, no clear boundaries. There is
no clear starting point or ending point (as would be the case of a region) or point of passage (as would
be the case of the relations in a network). “In a fluid space it’s not possible to determine identities nice
and neatly, once and for all or to distinguish inside from outside, this place from somewhere else.
Similarity and difference aren’t like identity and non-identity. They come, as it were, in varying
shades and colours. They go together.” (pp. 660). Secondly, a fluid is a mixture and made up of
heterogeneous entities. These entities may or may not be fluid themselves. It may not be possible to
separate the individual components of a fluid or to mix them. Thirdly, fluids are robust. They can be
shaped and re-shaped and are continuous even within such transformations.
de Laet and Mol (2000) describe technology (in the form of the Zimbabwe Bush Pump) as “fluid”. A
fluid has six characteristics some of which are closely related. A fluid has: no clear boundaries;
multiple identities; mixtures; robustness; continuity; and dissolving ownership. We will consider each
of these characteristics. Possibly the most important and defining characteristic is that the boundaries
of a fluid technology are not clear. Boundaries are defined by all that is needed to make the technology
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work. This leads to the second and closely related characteristic of multiple identities. There are many
answers to asking the question “What is the Zimbabwe Bush Pump?” It is a water pumping device, a
hydraulic system, a sanitation device, a health provider, a community builder and a nation builder
among others. Each identity has its own boundaries that are defined by what is needed for the
technology to work as that identity. The boundaries are different for each identity and change over
time. The identities themselves are not stable and change over time and in different contexts. Some
identities may be emergent resulting from collective use of the technology reaching a certain level, e.g.
nation building and water infrastructure. Some identities of the technology are defined by elements in
its environment and not by its own elements. As a consequence of the multiple identities, the fluid can
be said to be robust as it is successful or unsuccessful based on which of its identities is working or not
working. It is not clear when it stops acting, achieves its aims and when it fails and falters. In the case
of the Bush Pump, some components could be substituted or done without. It is however not that kind
of robustness which is conveyed. Lots of things can make the pump stop working. The robustness
arises from its multiple identities and comes from its multiple purposes providing no single weak link
that can make all the identities come apart. The fluid is also continuous. It may have existed before but
not in the same way. When new systems come in, old systems do not disappear. The fluid technology
may be specific and unique but share characteristics with others, a family resemblance, which forms
continuity. The fluid technology is also a mixture. It is part of other elements which could be fluids
themselves. The mixtures however have a need to collaborate with each other if the technology is to
work. The collaboration does not have to be rigid and can be flexible and adaptive. Finally the fluid
technology has a dissolving ownership. The ownership is fluid in itself allowing the technology the
flexibility to have unclear boundaries and multiple identities.
Global fluids are described as the “uneven, emergent and unpredictable shapes that such fluids take”
as they “create over time their own context for action rather than being seen as caused by such a
context” (Urry, 2003, pp. 60). Examples given by Urry include the Internet, Global brands and Social
movements.

3

METHODOLOGY

We use qualitative case study methodology for this study. Firstly, qualitative research seeks to
establish meanings of events or phenomenon has seen through the participants (Cresswell, 2003).
Qualitative research is geared towards gaining a deeper understanding of human behaviour to uncover
the reasons behind some of the events. Secondly, ‘in general, case studies are the preferred strategy
when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events,
and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context’ (Yin, 2003). Case
study methodology is appropriate in our research as we are investigating contemporary phenomenon
within its real life context and the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident. The knowledge transfer we are researching exist only within the contexts in which they
occurred. The research intends to describe what took place and will thus be descriptive and narrative
as well as analytical and theoretical. The case study method will compliment and bridge the two
purposes. The questions we are seeking to ask are definitely ‘how’ and ‘why’ and this is not a
controlled experiment and the researcher has no control over events which is further criteria
supporting case study methodology (Yin, 2003).
Most of the evidence collected was in the form of interviews which from Yin (2003) is the most
important source of case study information. The interviews were open-ended mixed with structured
questions in attempting to determine specific details but also to obtain the subjects opinions and
perspectives, a view purported by Yin (2003). By talking to different people who have experienced the
same events, multiple interpretations were obtained. This was useful for contrasting, comparing and
identifying any possible biases. Where confidentiality was not an issue, documents such as
presentations that were made or minutes of meetings were also obtained and studied. Being able to use
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multiple sources of evidence is a major strength of the case study approach and increases its validity
(Yin, 2003).
In total, 16 people were interviewed in Norway and Malaysia with an average of 2 hours per
interview. Some of the key people were interviewed more than once. The interviews were held
between January and June 2004. All the people in Telenor and DiGi that were directly involved in the
transfer and implementation of the CPA system were interviewed. This included the Telenor CPA
Manager, DiGi’s Marketing Director, the two DiGi managers that were responsible for the CPA, the
Telenor Project Manager that worked in DiGi on the CPA system and DiGi’s CEO. Some of the
people involved from the other mobile operators in Malaysia (Maxis and Celcom), Malaysia’s TV3,
and Howtraffic were also interviewed.

4

THE NORWEGIAN CPA SYSTEM

Telenor (Norway) introduced Mobilinfo, the first premium SMS (Short Message Service or known as
Text messages in some countries) content system, in 1997. Premium SMS are SMSes that are charged
at a premium rate, higher than the normal person-to-person rates. MobilInfo involved the mobile
operator doing almost everything by itself, including creating much of the content and promoting it
under their brand. The CPA System was introduced in late 1999 to co-exist with Mobilinfo. The CPA
System was intended purely for revenue generation whilst Mobilinfo was kept for brand building,
promoting often exclusive content as part of marketing activities.
In the CPA System, third party companies (companies that have no affiliation to the mobile operator)
are provided an infrastructure to sell content to the mobile operators customers. A Content Provider
(or CP is a company which has mobile content to sell) approaches the two main mobile operators,
Telenor and Netcom. There will be a contract to sign, a connection fee and a monthly connection
maintenance charge. The contract will specify the standard revenue terms which is based on a revenue
share where typically the CP would receive 70% of the end-user price for which there would be
pricing structures to follow. The CP will be assigned the same access number for both Telenor and
Netcom. The access number is the number the customer sees and uses to buy the mobile content
(typically in 2001, logos and ringtones). In Norway it is a 4 digit number (e.g. 2075). The CP would
have to configure its Content Handling Platform (which manages the storage and retrieval of content)
to connect to each mobile operator’s CPA Platform (which handles the delivery and billing interfaces).
Some CPs act as Content Aggregators where they offer their Content Handling Platform to smaller
companies who do not wish to invest in a platform. Once connected, the CP is able to deliver his
content as an SMS to the mobile operator’s customers and obtain payment from the mobile operator.
The mobile operator’s customers will pay for the content as part of their normal billing arrangement
with the mobile operator.

5

THE MALAYSIAN SMS CONTENT MARKET

Malaysia had in 2001, 5 mobile operators: Maxis, Celcom, DiGi, TMTouch and Time. Maxis was the
largest company in terms of market share and profitability. Table 1 below gives a comparison of all
the companies.
Maxis
Market Share (%)
32.5
Pretax Profit / Loss RM 777
millions
Table 1.

Celcom
27.5
-68

DiGi
17.5
189

TMTouch
15
2.4

Time
7.5
-44

Malaysian Mobile Operators Market Share and Profitability for 2001
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Each mobile operator would mostly sell content under its brand with a limited number of external CPs.
Agreements with these CPs would typically have been individually negotiated with variances in the
terms; the end-user price would be controlled and the majority of the revenue kept by the mobile
operator. The SMS mobile content business was considered small and producing limited revenue.
DiGi had a limited CPA type platform at that time and a few CPs connected to this platform. DiGi
negotiated terms (and revenue shares) individually with each of these companies and set the end-user
prices.

6

THE KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER PROCESS TO DIGI

In mid 2001, Telenor brought in one of their senior managers to be the new Marketing Director (MD)
in DiGi. The new MD had been involved in the creation of Telenor’s CPA System in Norway. Telenor
however did not send him to DiGi because of his background with the CPA. As he put it ‘I was not
there to promote the CPA as such but knew it was a good concept’. Around this time as well, Telenor
had put together a small team to transfer knowledge of the success of the Norwegian CPA system to
its affiliate companies.
In Sep 2001, with the support of DiGi’s MD, two members of this Telenor CPA team travelled to DiGi
to describe the CPA system. Their presentation described the various components of the CPA system:
the connections and functions of the CPA platform; the revenue share model of 70% to the CP and
30% to the operator; standard terms to the CPs; cooperation among the operators on access numbers
and pricing policies; and its success in terms of revenue generation. It was the first time that the DiGi
managers had heard about the CPA system. After the meeting, no one from DiGi who was at the
meeting contacted the Telenor CPA team in Norway nor was anything done in DiGi as a consequence
of the meeting.
Around Oct 2001, the DiGi MD initiated a small team made up of a manager from Product
Development and one from Mobile VAS (Value Added Services). Both of them had been in the
meeting with the Telenor CPA team the previous month. They were given the task of revamping
DiGi’s mobile content business. One of the managers didn’t initially see this as being connected to the
Telenor CPA teams’ presentation the previous month. The two managers came back to the MD with
different options. Although they were aware of details of the CPA System and they did incorporate
ideas from it, they developed what they felt was relevant for their context. In particular, they felt that
the revenue share between DiGi and the CPs should be negotiable. A few meetings took place between
the MD and these two managers. As the MD put it “I was pushing them in the direction of the CPA
system but not imposing it”. The two DiGi managers could see that some of the shortcomings of the
current system could be solved with the CPA system. Those shortcomings included a limited
advertising and promotions budget for mobile content and being unable to work with CPs with content
they knew could generate revenue but weren’t sure if they wished to associate with the DiGi brand. As
this discussion progressed in DiGi and started to involve more people, there was some debate on the
basic idea of opening up the value chain to external parties and giving them the major part of the
revenue share. The thinking for some people in DiGi thus far had always been that DiGi should do its
mobile content business largely by itself. But the MD was championing it and had the support of the
CEO (also a Telenor expatriate).
The Telenor presentation in September and the meetings with the MD were largely on the concept; the
DiGi managers were now also starting to grapple as one put it with ‘how to actually launch’. In the
mean time, a Telenor Project Manager (PM) who had worked on the CPA in Norway was brought to
Telenor’s affiliate company in Thailand in Oct 2001 to assist with the CPA project there. His
involvement in the Thai project would only last a few months and his girlfriend (working in Telenor)
was being sent to DiGi. He knew the MD in DiGi and that DiGi was working on implementing the
CPA system. He contacted the MD to ask if there was an opportunity for him to work on the CPA
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project in DiGi. The MD discussed this with the CEO and after a while decided that they could use
him on a six month contract to assist in the implementation. The Telenor PM was invited in Dec 2001
to have a meeting in DiGi with the Marketing and IT departments. One of the two DiGi managers that
had been working on revamping the system said ‘we did not see the light till this guy came and that it
was all about one short code one rate’. As the MD put it ‘It was a matter of timing as well as content.
They (the two managers) were more primed when he (the Project Manager) came in’. Although there
were no specific requests from the DiGi managers to have this Telenor PM work at DiGi, they
supported the MD’s decision to do so. Even before the Telenor PM started working in DiGi, the DiGi
managers saw that they would need a new content handling and messaging platform. They also began
to strategize how to approach the other mobile operators and how to seek final approval from the
Ministry of Communications. At the higher levels of the organization, the MD with the support of
DiGi’s CEO, was able to secure the resources needed, in particular to develop a new messaging
platform to support the CPA system. As a DiGi manager said ‘he (the MD) was championing this with
the management.’
In Jan 2002, the Telenor PM started working as an ‘Advisor’ on DiGi’s CPA Project. He worked
closely within a team of local managers in DiGi. The team worked out the functional specifications for
the CPA platform and invited proposals/quotations from a number of software solution providers. The
Telenor PM provided knowledge of Telenor’s CPA platform in developing the functional
specifications. He also got statistics on usage and queue handling from Norway. On the commercial
side, the agreement for CPs was taken from Telenor and worked upon by DiGi’s legal personnel to
adapt it for local laws and practices.

7

THE KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER PROCESS TO THE OTHER
OPERATORS

In Jan 2002, DiGi’s CEO brought up the CPA system and cooperation on access numbers at the
monthly CEO meeting among mobile operators at the MCMC (Malaysian Communications and
Multimedia Commission). This made it easier for DiGi to call for the first meeting with all the
operators later that same month. However before the meeting took place, all the operators were invited
for a meeting by one of the local television stations, TV3. The meeting consisted largely of a
presentation by a Malaysian wireless technology company called Howtraffic. The previous year, the
CEO of Howtraffic had won a competition for WAP development organized by Ericsson in Malaysia.
The prize was attending the Mobility World Seminar in Washington in Mar 2001. One of the speakers
there was John Strand from Strand Consulting who described the trends of the Scandinavian markets.
The CEO talked more to Strand at dinner and that led him to see SMS as the tool for interactive TV.
Howtraffic worked with TV3 to provide technical solutions for programs that required interaction with
the viewers (e.g. voting). They saw the problem of 5 different access codes and sometimes prices, with
the 5 mobile operators. TV3 wanted to help and called for the meeting with the operators on behalf of
Howtraffic. The CEO needed the clout of the TV station to get the operator’s attention. As he put it
“with only 3 days notice (for the meeting) all the operators showed up”. He also felt that they would
see the value of the cooperation as “only a few months ago they had SMS inter-operator connect and
SMS traffic sky rocketed”.
The TV3/Howtraffic meeting added a little momentum to the meeting called by DiGi. For DiGi’s
meeting, there was some uncertainty about which department this concerned and all the operators sent
mostly personnel from the regulatory and numbering departments. The MD (from DiGi) chaired the
meeting and gave the introduction. As the MD put it “We had a credible story and had a humble
approach to the topic. We did not want to appear as coming there to teach them how to do business”.
A DiGi manager then gave a presentation entitled ‘The Content Market in Malaysia – A Common
Approach’. The presentation covered the CPA system success in Norway, the advantage of this system
to the mobile operators and content providers. TV3 and Howtraffic were presented as ‘a real life
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example’ showing how common short codes and standard charges would make advertisements clearer
and easier for the TV station, content provider and users. The meeting ended with a plan to meet again
where the other mobile operators would give their feedback or other proposals on what was discussed.
As one manager from one of the operators said “we were keen to know what they were doing (in other
countries like Norway) and take advantage of ideas. Not really different from what we can do”.
The second meeting was held in Feb 2002. This time people from marketing and product development
were strongly represented by all the operators. Maxis presented their thoughts in the form of three
possible systems. All three systems required cooperation on numbering and prices and one was the
same as DiGi’s proposal. Maxis appearing as involved as DiGi and the change in the composition of
the attendees made a difference between the first meeting and the second. All of Maxis’s systems were
discussed by the group but the one which was the same as DiGi’s was seen as the best option. Despite
some opinions to the contrary, DiGi pushed for keeping the maximum value at RM 10 and for the
access numbers to be 4 digits (as it was in Norway). It was agreed that DiGi would draft the proposal
to MCMC and send it to the other operators for their feedback. One manager from the operators said
“Everybody saw the same need. All knew the content provider view, what would help them”. A
manager from another operator said “Not a big project (process/decision). Not 1001 different
approaches. Everyone had a common understanding”.
After this meeting a discussion on email followed on the number of digits with both Maxis and
Celcom seeing the need for it to be 5 digits to cater for a larger number of content providers and DiGi
holding on to what was agreed in the last meeting saying that 4 digits would be easier to remember. In
the end it was agreed to have 5 digits with each operator managing a number series according to its
prefix (Celcom (019) – 39xxx, DiGi (016) – 36xxx, Maxis (012) – 32xxx, Time (017) – 37xxx and
TMTouch (013) – 33xxx). The operators would let each other know which number they had assigned
to a Content Provider so that the CP could have that same number with all the operators. A draft of the
proposal to MCMC by DiGi was also circulated to the other operators. TMTouch brought up a new
matter saying that since this involved the CPs directly, it should be discussed with the CPs to take their
views into account.
The 3rd meeting was held in April 2002. The number system was confirmed along with a decision not
to charge CPs for this number. Each operator would decide independently on setup, access and
maintenance fees and disclose these amounts among the operators so that there would not be too large
differences. Twenty-one tariff categories from RM 0.30 to RM 10.00 were also finalized. On
TMTouch’s wanting to involve the CPs in this discussion, none of the other operators saw the need. It
was agreed to send the revised proposal to MCMC within a week but TMTouch said they would let
the group know if they could meet this deadline. The proposal to MCMC was only finally sent in July
2002. TMTouch had by then pulled out of the discussion and was not one of the signatories in the
MCMC proposal. TMTouch however subsequently cooperated with the other operators on what was
agreed. On the whole process one manager from an operator felt it would have happened anyway
saying “If DiGi kept quiet, Maxis would have done something. It was good that DiGi did this because
they had the business case. Because of Telenor they had more to say”.

8

DISCUSSION

8.1

Global Fluids

We start with examining the whole, reflecting on Urry’s (2003) understanding of “global fluids”. The
CPA system is meant to accept any and all CPs and any and all content. The CP decides and takes the
risk with regards to choice and price of content. If the content sells everyone makes money, if not, the
CP can try some other content. If any authority doesn’t like any content, the operators sanction or
disconnect the CP. There was no restriction or even discussion on what technical solution the
operators or the CPs should use. The CPA system was meant to accommodate different solutions.
607

There is no governance structure, no binding agreements among the operators. The only document was
a proposal sent to inform MCMC. One operator did not put its name to that proposal and that did not
make a difference in practice. The CPs have agreements with each operator and each their own
separate terms. Telenor/DiGi wanted to have standard agreements and terms to the CPs they
contracted with just as the Norwegian CPA system did. Some operators followed and some didn’t and
the Malaysian CPA system worked fine with that. Telenor/DiGi similarly pushed for 4 digit access
numbers but finally 5 digit numbers were agreed and that worked fine too. The CPA system despite
being a fairly complicated system involving a number of different actors, routines and technology was
“fluid”.
Another point worth reflecting on involves the introduction where we started by describing how
research has been upholding inter-firm knowledge transfer as more valuable and efficient than the
market. This case has shown however that the borders and distinction between inter-firm and market
knowledge are not so clear. The fluid view exposes that putting things into regions or even networks
and trying to clarify what is inside and what is outside does not always fit reality. For this practice,
inter-firm and market, one country’s knowledge and another, local and global, all co-exist as a whole.
The global constitutes the local and vice versa and both are not static but interact constantly with each
other. Strand, Howtraffic, TV3, SMS inter-operator connect, other operators, content providers and
vendors, all contributed along with Telenor and DiGi to the CPA system being re-created in Malaysia.
8.2

A Fluid Core?

Does a fluid have a core? If it’s family resemblance which guides inside from outside, belonging from
not belonging, is there then a key characteristic or property?
Telenor were selective with regards to what knowledge they brought with them in their first
presentation. They wanted to re-create the whole CPA system in Malaysia, yet only intended to
transfer knowledge on certain areas. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, there are a lot of
parts and details in a large system, some documented and some not. The two Telenor managers simply
did not have all the details. Secondly, Telenor’s CPA technical platform was considered too
customized to be of any value outside Telenor. Thirdly, there were too many differences between
Telenor and its role in the Norwegian market compared to DiGi and its role in the Malaysian market.
How Telenor had implemented the CPA system and got the agreement of the other operator in Norway
did not seem relevant for DiGi as their circumstances would be very different. Fourthly, what was
considered the key and unique to the CPA system was letting the CPs drive the content business. The
content business was not best run by the operator but by numerous small companies churning out a
large variety of content. That made the CPA system a success story. As one Telenor manager said
“The CPA system is a systematic approach to content providers and a business system that works”. If
there is a core perhaps part of it is in the form of a problem rather than a solution. The problem would
be ‘how to make it easy for content providers to develop the content business whilst keeping a
profitable business for the operators?’ It is interesting to think of the core of a best practice as a
problem and then allowing the solution to emerge and grow in the new context. This fits in with the
emergent and context filling description of global fluids.
8.3

Identity

In the case of the bush pump in de Laet & Mol (2000), the multiple identities were all aligned and
pulling in the same direction. That alignment as the object goes through time and space is critical to
the flow. It is however not always possible or even likely that the multiple identities all pull in the
same direction. At the point when the Telenor managers made their first presentation in DiGi we see
identities of the CPA system that were emphasized by Telenor as well as those that were deliberately
down played. It was not portrayed as a technical solution. Technical needs would be assessed and
determined later and internally within DiGi. It was also not really portrayed as a Telenor invention but
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more as a success for the whole Norwegian mobile content market (operators, content providers and
consumers). There was however one basic identity it carried that resulted in the DiGi managers not
doing anything with it. It was seen as a solution to a problem the DiGi managers didn’t feel they had.
All best practices are in fact solutions of one form or another. Its creation was in fact a solution to a
problem in its original context. The problem that this best practice is to solve in the new context may
not be recognizable in the same form or prioritized as a problem that needed solving. The DiGi
managers didn’t know what to do with it and saw it as something not for them.
As the MD told them to work on revamping their existing mobile content business only then did they
start to see and understand the problem for which the CPA system might be the solution. Over time the
CPA system appeared not only as a solution but a good solution. The identity of the CPA system was
still that of a solution but now it was a solution for them. The all important difference is that it was
previously a Norwegian solution to a Norwegian problem but now a Norwegian (perhaps even a
Malaysian) solution to a Malaysian problem. The shift occurred through a process of self-realization
that they went through after the MD asked them to work on this. As their knowledge here increased so
did their ability to see the possibilities with the CPA system. This is also supported by research on
Absorptive Capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
When DiGi described the CPA system to the other operators, the CPA system carried the identity of a
success story and a global development. The Norwegian MD deliberately asked one of DiGi’s local
managers to make the presentation even though he or the Norwegian PM would have had added
credibility. It was a deliberate attempt to manage the identities that could be associated with this. It
was Malaysians talking about Malaysian problems and solutions. Using Howtraffic and TV3 as an
example made that even more apparent. A turning point came in the 2nd meeting among the operators
when Maxis made a presentation as well, showing interest and involvement. The identity the CPA
system carried then was something that the largest operator in Malaysia was interested in. It was seen
now as an initiative that was likely to take place. For the other operators it was now more a case of not
wanting to be left out than a question of whether to join. That could be interpreted as having some
level of pressure as well. The pressure however is an effect stemming from the actions of the MD and
Maxis which could be explained by their having ownership to the process.
8.4

Ownership and Control

Who owned the CPA system in Malaysia at its origins is similar to asking who owned the transfer or
re-creation process. The two Telenor managers had ownership when they came to Malaysia. The MD
took on some ownership and at some point so did the two local DiGi managers. The Telenor PM took
on some and so did more DiGi managers as the implementation project started and more people got
involved. Strand, Howtraffic and TV3 took on some ownership and played their parts. Maxis took on
ownership too and that created an impetus among the other operators. As important as taking
ownership appears to be releasing ownership. The two Telenor managers played a supporting and
background role instead of trying to control the process. The MD took a guiding role but also releasing
ownership and control to the DiGi local managers and the Telenor PM. DiGi released some ownership
to Maxis in the 2nd meeting letting them make the main presentation. The other operators all had to
take some ownership and control when ‘fighting’ DiGi over the choice of 5 over 4 digit access
numbers. DiGi had to release then too. The other operators took ownership of their individual and
collective responsibilities as did the content providers in operating the system. The taking and
releasing of ownership and control resulted in the flow. The credibility and position of the ownership
taker also had an effect. Time (the smallest operator) taking the lead in the 2nd meeting would not have
had the same effect as Maxis doing so. Howtraffic played its part but reached the limit of how far it
could go after the TV3 initiated meeting. DiGi on its own may have also reached some limit with the
operators. Combined with Telenor however they had more credibility and greater effect. In the end the
final CPA system in Malaysia had numerous owners and parties with vested interest but perhaps no
singular actor with any dominant ownership or control.
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9

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

When Telenor, or any other company, attempt’s it’s next best practice re-creation, what good would it
do them to consider the practice as ”fluid”?
Firstly, to understand that fluids do not have clear boundaries. In terms of the best practice, that makes
determining what to actually transfer as an important decision. Everything is not possible, as it would
be very difficult to determine what the best practice includes/excludes. It would also generally contain
too much and be too complex to do. If a fluid core does exist we suggest that it should be in the form
of a problem statement. A best practice is afterall a solution that addressed a problem in the original
context. In transferring the solution there is perhaps a natural tendency to describe the solution before
discussing the problem that this is supposed to solve. The problem in the new context may not be seen,
exist in the same way or be prioritzed as a problem. This is related to a second fluid property, as fluids
have multiple identities that are different from each other and to various groups of people. One
identity a best practice could have is being a solution to a problem the new country doesn’t have.
Another identity could be that of something that is being pushed by the head office. Identities of the
best practice maybe negative due to no fault of the best practice itself. This turns to how the transfer
process is run. How the knowledge is packaged and can be viewed by the receiving parties requires
consideration.
Thirdly, an important cause of the flow of a fluid is due to changing ownership and control. What is
important is not only taking ownership but also releasing ownership. When transferring a best practice,
what needs to be transferred is not just the knowledge but the ownership as well. How that is acheived
is related to the various identities the best practice can have. An understanding of how the best practice
could be identified by certain groups in a way that would make them want to take ownership and
control needs to be considered especially when it is clear that a flow is not happening.
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